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1495 
FLIGHT AND FEDERALISM: FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
OF STATE AND LOCAL DRONE LAWS 
Nicholas Cody* 
Abstract: Small, unmanned aircraft referred to as “drones” are becoming increasingly 
common in the skies above the United States. Their increasing ubiquity has been driven by the 
wide variety of industries and tasks to which they can be applied, but it has also drawn the 
attention of government. Where Amazon.com sees the potential for packages delivered in 
thirty minutes or less, governments see crowded skies and clumsy pilots, to name only two 
potential risks associated with the widespread integration of drones into the national airspace. 
To that end, just as Amazon.com has ambitiously made use of the technology, state and local 
governments have begun to actively regulate drone use. The City of Chicago, for example, 
enacted an ordinance essentially banning drones within city limits. 
A major legal hurdle potentially stands in the way of those state and local efforts: The 
federal government has also regulated the commercial use of drones. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), guided by congressional direction to safely accelerate the process of 
integrating drones into the national airspace, promulgated comprehensive regulations 
governing commercial drone use. This overlap with state and local laws leads to issues of 
preemption. The doctrine of preemption reflects the principle that, in the United States, where 
a (valid, constitutional) federal law conflicts with a state or local law, the federal law 
supersedes its counterparts. 
This comment explores the issue of federal preemption of state and local drone laws. It 
concludes—based on a survey of preemption law, useful analogues from other areas of law, 
and first-of-its-kind drone preemption litigation—that restrictive drone laws like Chicago’s are 
preempted by the FAA regulations. Yet all is not lost for the state or local government wishing 
to have a say in matters of drone regulation. As this comment explains, there are strong 
arguments that state and local governments can regulate certain uses of drones, particularly in 
light of a doctrine known as the presumption against preemption. To that end, some state and 
local laws are clearly safe from preemption challenges. Others are just as clearly preempted. 
Finally, there is a category of state and local laws that fall somewhere in between those two 
extremes, for which the outcome of future preemption challenges is unclear. 
INTRODUCTION 
Small unmanned aircraft systems—more commonly known as 
“drones”—have skyrocketed in popularity, and the trend is not anticipated 
                                                     
* J.D. candidate, University of Washington School of Law, 2019. I would like to thank Professors 
Lisa M. Manheim, Ryan Calo, and Sanne Knudsen, all of whom were invaluable resources for this 
Comment. I am also thankful to the many members of the Washington Law Review’s editorial staff 
whose feedback and editing made this Comment significantly better.  
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to abate anytime soon.1 Drones initially became popular as aerial 
platforms for high-definition cameras, and are now also marketed for 
commercial and governmental applications.2 As a result of their 
widespread popularity and increasing ubiquity, however, there have been 
a number of accidents involving irresponsibly flown drones.3 Drones have 
also proven ripe for intentional misuse.4 Concerns about the threats posed 
by drone technology have caused many to call for greater government 
intervention.5 The federal government, as well as state and local 
governments, have responded by regulating many aspects of drone use. 
The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act 
of 2012 (FAAMRA)6 directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
to regulate commercial drone use in the United States.7 FAAMRA 
prohibits the FAA from regulating drones used exclusively for “hobby” or 
“recreational” purposes.8 Therefore, the FAA’s exclusive focus is 
commercial, income-generating drone use.9 In 2016, the FAA 
promulgated Part 107, an intricate set of regulations governing many 
aspects of commercial drone operations.10 For example, Part 107 requires 
all commercial drone operators to be licensed and requires every drone 
weighing more than five pounds to be registered with the federal 
government.11 It also prohibits drone operation at night, at altitudes 
exceeding 400 feet, or outside the drone operator’s line-of-sight.12 
                                                     
1. FAA Releases 2016 to 2036 Aerospace Forecast, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Mar. 26, 2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=85227 [https://perma.cc/92E8-YD5J]. 
2. See generally infra notes 14–20. 
3. See, e.g., Steve Miletich, Pilot of Drone that Struck Woman at Pride Parade Gets 30 Days in 
Jail, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:21 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/crime/pilot-of-drone-that-struck-woman-at-pride-parade-sentenced-to-30-days-in-jail/ (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
4. See, e.g., Paighten Harkins, Utah Man Convicted of Using Drone to Spy on People in Their 
Homes Gets Suspended Jail Sentence, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2017/10/31/utah-man-convicted-of-using-drone-to-spy-on-people-in-
their-homes-gets-suspended-jail-sentence/ [https://perma.cc/MK4P-AZ27]. 
5. See, e.g., Alan Levin, Drone’s Close Encounter with Jet Spurs Call to Tighten Laws, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
13/drone-s-close-encounter-with-airliner-spurs-call-to-tighten-laws (last visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
6. Pub. L. No. 112-95 (2012). 
7. Id. § 332(a)(1). 
8. Id. § 335(a)(1). 
9. See infra note 48.  
10. 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018). 
11. See generally infra section I.B. 
12. Id. 
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Following the enactment of Part 107, state and local governments also 
promulgated drone regulations.13 Some took a relatively narrow approach. 
In Washington State, for example, pending legislation would outlaw the 
use of a drone to deliver contraband to a prison.14 Other states expanded 
existing criminal statutes to affirmatively outlaw the use of a drone to 
commit invasion-of-privacy crimes like voyeurism.15 Still others took a 
much more restrictive approach, passing ordinances that prohibit drone 
flight above public or private land without the landowner’s permission.16 
Given the inherently mobile nature of drones, a restriction prohibiting 
flight over any land except that of the drone’s owner essentially prohibits 
drone flight entirely.17 In Singer v. City of Newton,18 a citizen in a 
jurisdiction that had done so successfully argued that the ordinance was 
preempted by Part 107.19 
This Comment takes up the issue of federal preemption of state and 
local drone laws. Part I provides a basic summary of drone technology, 
summarizes the regulations in Part 107, and provides examples of 
common state and local drone regulations. Part II sketches the 
constitutional outlines of the preemption doctrine, examines two specific 
aspects of that doctrine implicated by Part 107, and explores an analogous 
area of the law—aerial advertising—in which preemption has been more 
thoroughly litigated. Part III addresses the issue of preemption of state and 
local drone laws. First, it looks to the FAA’s own analysis of the 
preemption issue, examines the Singer court’s reasoning, and then draws 
analogies to aerial advertising cases to determine how future courts will 
analyze the issue. Ultimately, Part III concludes that restrictive laws like 
those in Singer interfere with Congress’s express intent to “integrate” 
drones into the national airspace, and are therefore preempted by Part 107. 
This Comment then argues that state laws that only revise existing 
criminal laws to prohibit the use a drone to commit a crime are not 
preempted by Part 107. Finally, this Comment concludes by considering 
those laws that fall somewhere in between those two extremes. For those, 
it argues that courts may resort to an aspect of preemption doctrine—
                                                     
13. See, e.g., H.B. 2363, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
14. Id. § 2(b). 
15. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61(1)(b) (2013) (including drones in a non-exhaustive list of 
instrumentalities with which a person can commit the felony of voyeurism). 
16. See infra sections III.B, III.D.1. 
17. Id.  
18. 284 F. Supp. 3d. 125 (D. Mass. 2017). 
19. Id. at 133. 
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known as the presumption against preemption—to uphold those laws 
against preemption challenges. 
I. DRONES HAVE PROMPTED A REGULATORY RESPONSE 
FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS FROM 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Drones are becoming increasingly common in the national airspace. 
This is largely a result of rapid advances in drone technology, which now 
provides a viable option for many recreational,20 commercial,21 and 
governmental applications.22 This Part briefly summarizes drone 
technology and its common uses. Then it details the regulations in 
Part 107. Finally, it summarizes three categories of state and local drone 
regulations: those imposing major operational restrictions, those revising 
criminal statutes to include the use of drones, and those falling somewhere 
in between. 
A. Drones Are Becoming Increasingly Ubiquitous, Which Raises 
Concerns 
“Unmanned aircraft systems” (colloquially and hereinafter “drones”) 
are becoming increasingly ubiquitous for recreational use,23 as well as in 
                                                     
20. See /r/drones, REDDIT (July 30, 2018), reddit.com/r/drones [https://perma.cc/M93S-C48U] 
(online community devoted to recreational drone activities, including drone cinematography, first-
person-view drone racing, and drone building). 
21. See, e.g., Allison I. Fultz, Flying Ahead of the Pack: Drones in the Agriculture Industry, 50 
MD. B.J. 22 (2017) (noting that, for agricultural applications, drones are equipped with “sensors that 
measure temperature, ground moisture, or the chemical composition of soils”); Drone Pipeline 
Inspections, LANDPOINT, http://www.landpoint.net/drone-services-for-oil-and-gas-pipeline-
inspections/ [https://perma.cc/UY5T-YBT8] (advertising its services as “one of the few FAA 
authorized UAV service providers to offer inspection services across the nation”); Drones, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF REALTORS, https://www.nar.realtor/drones [https://perma.cc/SS2J-YEB2] (promoting the 
use of drone photography in real estate marketing and offering guidance regarding the legality of such 
applications). One would be remiss in failing to mention online mega-retailer Amazon.com’s “Prime 
Air,” its bold proposal to create “a delivery system . . . designed to safely get packages to customers 
in 30 minutes or less using . . . drones.” See Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?node=8037720011 [https://perma.cc/YLD6-BVT6]. 
22. For example, law enforcement agencies utilize drones to photograph the scene of automobile 
collisions. See, e.g., Steve Kiggins, State Troopers Testing Drones to Speed up Crash Scene 
Investigations, Q13 FOX (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:40 PM), http://q13fox.com/2017/08/31/state-troopers-
testing-drones-to-speed-up-crash-scene-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/F6ZL-3EMH]. For those 
expressing concern about the potential for surveillance-by-drone, see Surveillance Drones, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones [https://perma.cc/4PWX-
TYHW]. 
23. See supra note 20. 
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commercial24 and governmental applications.25 The FAA, the federal 
agency tasked with regulating and integrating drones,26 anticipates that 
drone sales will increase from roughly 2.5 million units in 2016 to 
7 million in 2020.27 Drones initially became popular as aerial platforms 
for cameras.28 For example, one of the world’s largest drone 
manufacturers advertises a 1.6-pound drone capable of capturing high-
definition video and still images, which retails for around $1,000.29 The 
flight capabilities of that drone worry regulators concerned about 
accidental or intentional drone misuse. It can achieve speeds of 40 miles 
per hour at a maximum altitude of 16,404 feet, and can operate from up 
to 4.3 miles away from its remote operator continuously for up to 
27 minutes before needing to recharge its battery.30 And that is just a 
consumer-level drone, marketed to hobbyists.31 Drones marketed for 
commercial and industrial applications are capable of much more.32 
Advanced aerial technology, accessible to many in the consumer 
market, comes with many dangers.33 For example, a Seattle man was 
sentenced to a month in jail after he crashed his drone and injured two 
people—knocking one unconscious—during Seattle’s 2012 pride 
parade.34 Shortly after that incident, also in Seattle, a drone crashed into 
the top of the Space Needle.35 
                                                     
24. See supra note 21. 
25. See supra note 22. 
26. See 49 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2018). 
27. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 1. 
28. See, e.g., Donald Melanson, Parrot AR.Drone Hits the US this September for $299, We Go 
Hands on with Video!, ENGADGET (June 15, 2010), https://www.engadget.com/2010/06/15/parrot-ar-
drone-hits-the-us-this-september-for-299/ [https://perma.cc/KDR4-9EFW]. 
29. Mavic Pro Specs, DJI, https://www.dji.com/mavic/info#specs [https://perma.cc/4AYG-
GA6W]. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32.  DJI’s Agras MG-1S drone is built for agricultural applications. The MG-1S model weighs 
close to 50 lbs. when loaded with substances for crop-spraying and can fly up to 15 meters per second 
(around 33.5 m.p.h.). DJI, supra note 29. DJI’s “professional level” cinematography drone, on the 
other hand, can achieve speeds of 58 m.p.h. and weighs about 8 pounds. Inspire 2 Specs, DJI, 
https://www.dji.com/inspire-2/info#specs [https://perma.cc/VH46-K9SZ]. 
33. See, e.g., Miletich, supra note 3. 
34. Id. 
35. Jessica Lee, Watch: Drone Crashes into Space Needle During New Year’s Eve Fireworks 
Setup, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/photo-
video/video/watch-drone-crashes-into-space-needle-during-new-years-eve-fireworks-setup/ (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
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In 2017, a drone struck a plane on final approach to a Canadian 
airport.36 Fortunately, the collision caused only minor damage, but it 
demonstrated the potential for a catastrophic accident.37 A recent 
academic study, conducted in association with the FAA, found that the 
possibility of drone-on-aircraft collisions poses serious risks.38 The study 
concluded that current aircraft construction standards are insufficient to 
withstand the potential damage from a drone strike.39 
Intentional drone misuse presents its own risks. Recently, a Utah man 
was convicted of using his drone to “video people in the[ir] bedrooms and 
bathrooms.”40 Officials worry that terrorists will one day use a drone to 
perpetrate a violent attack.41 Concerns like these have spurred federal, 
state, and local governments to regulate drones within their jurisdictions.42 
B. Part 107 Establishes Comprehensive Federal Regulations 
Regarding Drones and Their Operation 
The FAA is the federal agency responsible for regulating United States 
airspace.43 Prior to 2011, the FAA experimented with integrating large, 
fixed-wing drones into the national airspace.44 Toward the end of the 
                                                     
36. Christina Caron, After Drone Hits Plane in Canada, New Fears About Air Safety, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/canada/canada-drone-plane.html (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
37. Id. 
38. Researchers Release Report on Drone Airborne Collisions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=89246&omniRss=news_updatesAoc&cid=101_N_U 
[https://perma.cc/U8AE-Y6FT] (noting that current aircraft manufacturing standards contemplate 
mid-air collisions with birds). 
39. Id. 
40. Harkins, supra note 4. 
41. Ben Popper, How Big a Threat Are Drones on Inauguration Day?, VERGE (Jan. 20, 2017, 10:27 
AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/20/14335836/inauguration-day-drones-threat-bomb-
security-detection-prevention [https://perma.cc/L7LP-2NW4] (considering the possibility of drones 
perpetrating a terrorist attack during the inauguration of Donald Trump); see also Robert Windrem, 
U.S. Fears New Threat from ISIS Drones, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2017, 12:16 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/u-s-fears-new-threat-isis-drones-n764246 
[https://perma.cc/5YR7-FR79] (reporting the U.S. military’s concern over an ISIS-released video 
showing the terrorist group using drones armed with bombs). 
42. See, e.g., Alan Levin, Drone’s Close Encounter with Jet Spurs Call to Tighten Laws, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
13/drone-s-close-encounter-with-airliner-spurs-call-to-tighten-laws (last visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
43. See 49 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2018). 
44. See, e.g., Jason Paur, FAA Experiments with Integrating Drones in Civil Airspace, WIRED (Jun. 
14, 2010, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/06/faa-uav-civil-airspace/ [https://perma.cc/J9H4-
8SPE]. At that time, the discussion around “drones” centered on unmanned warplanes in the Middle 
East. See, e.g., David E. Anderson, Drones and the Ethics of War, PBS (May 14, 2010), 
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decade, smaller, consumer-oriented drones—more closely resembling 
those that are common today—became commercially available.45 As a 
result, Congress acted to integrate this new class of drone into the national 
airspace.46 FAAMRA directed the FAA to “develop[ ] a comprehensive 
plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems 
into the national airspace system.”47 FAAMRA directed the FAA to 
regulate only the commercial use of drones.48 It specifically prohibited the 
FAA from regulating “model aircraft” used entirely for “hobby or 
recreational” purposes.49 
In early 2015, the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for 
the “Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems.”50 
In mid-2016, the agency promulgated the final rule, codified at 14 C.F.R. 
107, now known as “Part 107.”51 
Part 107’s most significant restrictions on the operation of drones 
include the following: (1) no person may operate a drone in a “careless or 
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another;”52 (2) no 
person may operate a drone at night,53 or during periods of civil twilight, 
                                                     
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2010/05/14/drones-and-the-ethics-of-war/6290/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ERP-EQVZ]. 
45. See Carrie Kahn, It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! It’s a Drone!, NPR (Mar. 14, 2011, 3:55 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/03/14/134533552/its-a-bird-its-a-plane-its-a-drone (last visited Sept. 15, 
2018). 
46. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 332(a)(1) (2012). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. § 336(a). Accordingly, the scope of this Comment is limited to those drone operations that 
generate income for their operator. 
49. Id. The FAA interprets a hobby as a “pursuit outside one’s regular occupation engaged in 
especially for relaxation” and recreation as “refreshment of strength and spirits after work; a means 
of refreshment or diversion.” 79 Fed. Reg. 36,171, 36,174 (June 25, 2014). The “hobbyist exception” 
applies only if “the [drone] is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use,” weighs less than fifty-five 
pounds, does not interfere with manned flight, stays within the line-of-sight of the operator, and, when 
operated within five miles of an airport, the operator notifies the control tower there. See Pub. L. No. 
112-95 § 336 (2012). The FAA maintains that any commercial element to drone operation disqualifies 
one from flying under the hobbyist exception, even if the operation is merely “in furtherance of a 
business, or incidental to a person’s business.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 36,174 (emphasis added). Therefore, 
while “[t]aking photographs with a model aircraft for personal use” or “[u]sing a model aircraft to 
move a box from point to point without any kind of compensation” would qualify as hobby or 
recreational uses, “[d]etermining whether crops need to be watered that are grown as part of 
commercial farming operation” or delivering a box for a fee would qualify as commercial applications 
triggering the restrictions of Part 107. Id.  
50. 80 Fed. Reg. 9,943, 9,543–90 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018)). 
51. 14 C.F.R. § 107. 
52. Id. § 107.23. 
53. Id. § 107.29(a). 
16 - Cody.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
1502 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1495 
 
unless the drone is equipped with anti-collision lighting;54 (3) no person 
may use a drone to carry hazardous materials;55 (4) no person may operate 
a drone “so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard”56 or 
fail to yield the right of way to other aircraft57; (5) no person may operate 
a drone over another human being unless that person is involved in the 
drone operation or under cover58; (6) no person may operate a drone at 
speeds greater than 100 miles per hour59 or higher than 400 feet above the 
ground level, unless the drone is operated from a building and flies no 
higher than 400 feet above the structure’s highest point60; and (7) no 
person may operate a drone outside of the drone operator or a visual 
observer’s unaided line-of-sight.61 Other restrictions include prohibiting 
operation of a drone from a moving vehicle,62 prohibiting one person from 
operating or observing more than one drone at a time,63 and prohibiting 
people from operating a drone under the influence of alcohol or drugs.64 
Part 107 also establishes requirements for drone operators themselves. 
A drone operator must (1) be at least sixteen years old; (2) be able to 
speak, write, and understand English; (3) not have a medical condition 
that would impede their ability to safely operate the drone; and (4) pass 
an FAA-administered knowledge test.65 The knowledge test covers a wide 
variety of topics. It includes not only those regulations and flight 
                                                     
54. Id. § 107.29(b). 
55. Id. § 107.36. Hazardous materials are defined and regulated elsewhere in the FAA regulations. 
See id. § 171.8 (2018) (providing hazardous materials definitions); id. § 172.101 (providing 
hazardous material carriage regulations). 
56. Id. § 107.37(b). 
57. Id. §107.37(a). 
58. Id. § 107.39. 
59. Id. § 107.51. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. § 107.31(a). The operator or visual observer’s vision must be “unaided by any device other 
than corrective lenses,” liberating those who wish to fly a drone but are shackled to the use of 
eyeglasses or contact lenses. Id. 
62. Id. § 107.25. 
63. Id. § 107.35. 
64. Id. § 107.27 (citing id. §§ 91.17, 91.19). By simply incorporating those regulations applicable 
to crewmembers of commercial aircraft, this restriction is perhaps more restrictive than it appears. 
While the provisions bar the operation of a drone “[w]hile under the influence of alcohol,” id. 
§ 91.17(a)(2), or “[w]hile using any drug that affects the person’s faculties in any way contrary to 
safety,” id. § 91.17(a)(3), it also prohibits a person from operating a drone “[w]ithin 8 hours after the 
consumption of any alcoholic beverage.” Id. § 91.17(a)(1). 
65. Id. § 107.61(d)(1). Notably, if a person is already a licensed airplane pilot, the person can 
bypass the knowledge test requirement by “complet[ing] an initial training course covering the areas 
of knowledge” focused on drone-specific regulations and operating constraints. Id. § 107.61(d)(2). 
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restrictions specific to drones,66 but also topics like “aviation weather 
sources,”67 “radio communication procedures,”68 and the “physiological 
effects of drugs and alcohol.”69 
Though Part 107’s regulations are comprehensive, they present a lower 
barrier to entry than other fields of aviation, contributing to drones’ 
increasing place in the national airspace.70 First, the cost of a drone—even 
a sophisticated, industrial model71—is far less than a manned aircraft.72 
Second, the FAA estimates that the total cost associated with drone 
operator certification is $150, which “is less than the cost of any other 
airman certification that allows non-recreational operations.”73 Notably, 
the FAA may waive a number of Part 107’s restrictions and requirements 
if it finds that the proposed operation can be conducted safely.74 
Part 107 is a significant body of restrictions and requirements for the 
commercial operation of drones.75 The regulations are silent, however, on 
the role of state and local governments in restricting the use of drones 
within their borders.76 
                                                     
66. Id. § 107.73(a)(1)–(2).  
67. Id. § 107.73(a)(3). 
68. Id. § 107.73(a)(7). 
69. Id. § 107.73(a)(9). 
70. See Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,067 (June 28, 2016). 
71. See, e.g., Inspire 2, DJI, https://store.dji.com/product/inspire-
2?site=brandsite&from=buy_now_bar [https://perma.cc/7NB4-SM29] ($2,999 base price for 
professional-level cinematography drone). 
72. See, e.g., R22 Beta II Price List, ROBINSON HELICOPTER CO. (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://robinsonheli.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/r22_pricelist.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q2U-
N92A] ($297,000 suggested price for small, two-person helicopter with standard equipment); 2017 
Cessna 182 Skylane, PLANE & PILOT (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/article/2017-cessna-182-skylane/#.WykgjGbMwWo 
[https://perma.cc/N72Q-UJ32] ($470,000 base price for four-person single-engine airplane). 
73. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063, 42,067 
(June 28, 2016) (codified in various sections of 14 C.F.R.). 
74. 14 C.F.R. § 107.200. Those sections subject to waiver include the requirement for daylight 
operations, id. § 107.29; the requirements for the use of a visual observer, id. § 107.33; the operation 
of more than one drone, id. § 107.35; the requirement that a drone yield the right of way, 
id. § 107.37(a); the restriction on operations over people, id. § 107.39; operations in certain protected 
airspace, id. § 107.41; speed and altitude limits, id. § 107.51; and both the restrictions for operation 
from a moving vehicle, id. § 107.25; and maintaining visual line-of-line sight, id. § 107.31, but in 
neither case will a waiver “be issued to allow the carriage of property of another by aircraft for 
compensation or hire.” Id. § 107.205(a). 
75. See generally id. § 107. 
76. Id. 
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C. State and Local Governments Have Responded to Concerns About 
Drones with a Variety of Laws 
State and local governments regulate drones in a wide variety of 
ways.77 This Comment organizes drone regulations into three categories: 
(1) those that impose significant operational restrictions, (2) those that 
merely expand existing criminal laws to include drones, and (3) those that 
fall somewhere in between. This Comment later concludes that Category 
1 laws will be preempted, Category 2 laws will not, and that the outcome 
for Category 3 laws is uncertain. 
1. Some State and Local Laws Regulate Drone Operations Similarly 
to Part 107 
In 2015, the City of Chicago substantially restricted legal drone 
operations within city limits.78 The city council, citing safety concerns 
posed by drones,79 restricted the use of drones to “hobby or recreational 
purposes.”80 The ordinance defines those terms in the same way as the 
FAA.81 The ordinance prohibits flight over “any person who is not 
involved in”82 the drone’s operation and “over property that the operator 
does not own.”83 Though it was enacted prior to Part 107, the ordinance 
incorporates many of the same restrictions, including a prohibition on 
flight over 400 feet,84 at night,85 and outside the operator’s line-of-sight.86 
One who violates the ordinance is subject to fines between $500 and 
                                                     
77. According to National Conference of State Legislatures, “[a]t least 38 states considered 
legislation related to UAS in the 2017 legislative session” alone. Current Unmanned Aircraft State 
Law Landscape, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 1, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/F2AM-MANY]. 
78. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 9-121; 10-36-380, 400 (amended July 29, 2015) (provided in CITY 
OF CHI., OFF. OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS 15 (Nov. 18, 2015), 
https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2393877&GUID=8BC7890A-DBA7-4640-
B475-7B46DEDBBE68&Options=ID%7CText%7C&Search=drone&FullText=1 
[https://perma.cc/4M7P-RJQM]). 
79. The City of Chicago specifically cited “‘flyaways,’ which occur when drones go rogue and fly 
off from their users,” a video showing “a handgun-firing drone,” a drone crashing into a St. Louis 
high-rise building, and “dozens of cases” of airplane pilots reporting close-calls with drones. Id. 
80. Id. § 10-36-400(b)(1). 
81. Id. § 10-36-400(a). 
82. Id. § 10-36-400(b)(2). 
83. Id. § 10-36-400(b)(3). 
84. Id. § 10-36-400 (b)(4). 
85. Id. § 10-36-400 (b)(8). 
86. Id. § 10-36-400 (b)(5). 
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$5,000 and may be imprisoned for up to 180 days.87 Each day a violation 
occurs constitutes a distinct violation of the ordinance.88 
Chicago appears to have anticipated a preemption challenge when the 
city council drafted the ordinance. The ordinance provides guidance for 
its construction.89 The most important provision states that the ordinance 
should not be interpreted to interfere with one’s right to operate a drone 
“pursuant to Section 333 of [FAAMRA] or a certificate of waiver . . . or 
other [FAA] grant of authority for a specific flight operation . . . .”90 
Section 333—which preceded Part 107—directed the FAA to determine, 
on a case-by-case basis, if certain drone operations could be safely 
conducted in the national airspace before a final rule was implemented.91 
The FAA used section 333 authority to grant a few thousand waivers.92 
Part 107, however, now provides a comprehensive framework of drone 
regulations, and section 333 waivers are no longer granted.93 In effect, 
then, the Chicago ordinance’s provision constitutes an exception for any 
drone operation pursuant to an “[FAA] grant of authority for a specific 
flight operation.”94 An argument could be made that Part 107 is just such 
a grant of authority. 
There are two problems with construing Part 107 as an “ [FAA] grant 
of authority for a specific flight operation.”95 First, nothing in Part 107 
                                                     
87. Id. § 10-36-400(d). 
88. Id.  
89. Id. § 10-36-400(c). 
90. Id. § 10-36-400(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
91. Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 333(a) (Feb. 14, 2012). Section 333 exemptions granted by the FAA are 
available on the FAA’s webpage. For example, Amazon.com petitioned for, and received, permission 
to test its “Prime Air” program under a Section 333 exemption. The waiver stated that “all operations 
shall be conducted in accordance with” a “Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA)” that was 
attached to Amazon.com’s application. Amazon.com, FAA Docket No. FAA-2014-0474, Exemption 
No. 11290 (Apr. 8, 2015), https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/amazon_com_11290.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DZ7N-UQZ5] (Section 333 exemption to Amazon.com). While the terms of that 
COA could not be located, several other drone-related COAs granted by the FAA are available. For 
example, the Seattle Police Department was granted a COA in 2011. Seattle Police Department, FAA 
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, Cert. No. 2010-WSA-41 (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Seattle 
Police Department Certificate of Authorization], https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ 
pra_seattle_police_drones_27_jul_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ2U-6FZG]. The COA allowed the 
Seattle Police Department to operate a Draganflyer X6 drone up to 400 feet in three ultra-specific 
locations within a radius (between one-quarter and one-half nautical mile) from exact geographic 
coordinates. Id. The COA expired in April 2012. Id. 
92. Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Feb. 10, 2017, 3:32 PM), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/ [https://perma.cc/8MFD-97UW]. 
93. Id. (“Petitions Granted” counter last updated Sept. 28, 2016). 
94. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(c)(1) (2018). 
95. Id. 
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provides a specific grant of authority, i.e., affirmative authorization, to 
operate a drone.96 Rather, it details how one who wants to operate a drone 
for commercial purposes must do so.97 When the exception to the Chicago 
ordinance was written, it appears that the drafters contemplated case-
specific waivers from the FAA, such as under Section 333, for which the 
ordinance’s language is more appropriate.98 For example, if a Section 333 
waiver designated specifically authorized flight routes, it could be 
construed as an affirmative grant of authority.99 On the other hand, 
Part 107 does not appear to give a “grant of authority” for any specific 
flight operation.100 For example, Part 107 does not expressly give a drone 
operator permission to fly over land without the owner’s permission; 
rather, it dictates what someone flying—over any land—must do and 
refrain from doing. 
Consider a realtor cited under the Chicago ordinance for taking videos 
of a home in the city. Assume further that the realtor was licensed under, 
and flying in compliance with, Part 107. The realtor would be guilty under 
Chicago’s ordinance of operating her drone over land without the owner’s 
permission if, for example, her flight crossed a neighboring yard or a 
public street.101 A court would most likely find that Part 107 does not 
expressly give the realtor permission to do so—it merely requires that she 
keep the drone within line-of-sight, under 400 feet, etc.102 Therefore, the 
Chicago ordinance’s exception would not apply,103 and the flight would 
be illegal.104 
                                                     
96. See generally 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018) (providing regulations for those choosing to operate 
drones, but nowhere affirmatively granting any person the right to do so). 
97. Id. (providing regulations for, inter alia, speed and altitude restrictions, drone regulation, and 
operator certification). 
98. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(c)(1). 
99. See, e.g., Seattle Police Department Certificate of Authorization, supra note 91. The COA 
authorized ultra-precise areas in which the Seattle Police Department could operate its drone. At least 
one of those locations (one-quarter mile radius from Warren G. Magnuson Park, 47° 40’ 45.52” N, 
122° 15’ 02.57” W) authorized flight over private property. Id. 
100. See 14 C.F.R. § 107 (establishing regulatory parameters for those choosing to operate drones, 
but not affirmatively granting a person the right to do so). 
101. See CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(b)(3) (2018) (prohibiting flight over public or private 
property without the property-owner’s permission).  
102. See 14 C.F.R. § 107 (only providing regulations for persons operating drones). 
103. See CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(c)(1) (creating an exception for operations conducted 
“pursuant to Section 333 of [FAAMRA] or a certificate of waiver . . . or [some] other [FAA] grant of 
authority for a specific flight operation(s)”). 
104. See id. § 10-36-400(b)(3). 
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The second problem is that the exception’s language refers to an FAA 
grant of authority “for a specific flight operation.”105 Like “FAA grant of 
authority,” that language was appropriate when the FAA granted case-by-
case waivers that authorized specific operations.106 Part 107, however, 
does not identify specifically permitted operations.107 It provides general 
rules for all operations: Altitude and line-of-sight requirements are in 
force no matter where the operations occur.108 The exception might be 
construed to apply in situations where the FAA waives portions of 
Part 107—in that case, it could be said that the FAA is authorizing a 
specific operation outside Part 107’s normal rules.109 For example, if the 
hypothetical Chicago realtor received an FAA waiver to operate a drone 
to record homes at night, which the Chicago ordinance prohibits,110 she 
might be able to argue that the FAA waiver constitutes a grant of authority 
for a “specific flight operation.”111 
For those two reasons, the exception to Chicago’s ordinance will not 
apply to cases in which a drone operator simply complies with Part 107. 
The most natural reading of that exception contemplates specific, case-
by-case authorizations, such as were authorized under Section 333. As a 
result, Chicago’s ordinance essentially functions to ban all drone 
operations within city limits, whether or not done in compliance with 
Part 107’s strictures. 
2. Other State and Local Laws Clarify Existing Criminal Statutes to 
Include Drone Use 
In contrast to Chicago’s effective ban on drone operations, some state 
and local laws expand existing criminal statutes to expressly prohibit 
conduct with a drone that would otherwise be illegal. For example, a 2017 
Michigan law creates a variety of drone-specific crimes.112 For instance, 
no person in Michigan required to register as a sex offender may “operate 
a[ ] [drone] to knowingly and intentionally follow, contact, or capture 
                                                     
105. Id. (emphasis added). 
106. See, e.g., Seattle Police Department Certificate of Authorization, supra note 91 (establishing 
specific geographic areas in which drone flight was permitted). 
107. See 14 C.F.R. § 107 (providing regulations for general, as opposed to specific, drone 
operations). 
108. Id. 
109. See CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(c)(1) (creating an exception for operations conducted 
“pursuant to . . . other [FAA] grant of authority for a specific flight operation”). 
110. Id. § 10-36-400(b)(8). 
111. Id. § 10-36-400(c)(1).  
112. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.322 (West 2017). 
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images of another individual, if the individual’s sentence in a criminal 
case would prohibit the individual from [doing so].”113 Michigan residents 
are also prohibited from operating a drone within a proximity of another 
person that, if the resident personally came that close, would violate a 
restraining order.114 A bill pending in the Washington State legislature 
amends existing criminal statutes to prohibit the use of a drone to deliver 
a deadly weapon or other contraband to a correctional facility.115 The 
penalty for doing so is the same as if the person personally delivered the 
contraband.116 
3. Other State and Local Laws Fall Somewhere in Between the Most 
and Least Restrictive Ordinances 
Many state and local laws fall somewhere in between restrictive laws 
like Chicago’s ordinance and laws that amend existing criminal statutes 
to bring drones within their ambit. These “middle-ground” laws create 
new binding legal rules for drone operators’ conduct, but are not so 
restrictive as to effectively ban drones entirely. Many of the state and local 
laws in this category relate to areas of law where state and local 
governments have historically been the dominant regulator, such as “land 
use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement operations.”117 A 
number of states, for example, have prohibited the use of a drone to hunt 
or fish.118 These laws clearly prevent some drone use in the national 
airspace that would occur otherwise, but leave plenty of room for other 
drone operation. 
                                                     
113. Id. § 259.322(4).  
114. Id. § 259.322(2). 
115. H.B. 2363, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). The bill has passed the Washington House of 
Representatives and is, as of this writing, pending in committee in the state Senate.  
116. Id. 
117.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION 
OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 3 (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BB8E-4CCG].  
118. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.40111(c)(2) (West 2017) (“An individual shall not 
take game or fish using an unmanned vehicle or unmanned device . . . .”); see also IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-22-6-16(c) (2018) (“[A] person may not knowingly use an unmanned aerial vehicle . . . to search 
for, scout, locate, or detect a wild animal to which the hunting season applies as an aid to take the 
wild animal.”); N.C. GEN. STAT ANN. § 14-401.24 (West 2018) (“It shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor 
for any person to fish or to hunt using an unmanned aircraft system.”). 
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D. The FAA Articulated a Non-Binding Position That Part 107 
Preempts State and Local Operational Drone Restrictions 
In promulgating Part 107, the FAA noted that it had received numerous 
inquiries and comments on the topic of preemption.119 However, it was 
“not persuaded that including a preemption provision in the final rule 
[was] warranted at [that] time” because the “preemption issues involving 
small [drones] necessitate a case-specific analysis that is not appropriate 
in a rule of general applicability.”120 Prior to issuing the final rule, the 
FAA issued a brief fact sheet “to serve as a guide for State and local 
governments as they respond to the increased use of [drones] in the 
national airspace.”121 The FAA did not state its position that certain types 
of state or local regulations were preempted by its regulations, but rather 
urged “consultation with the FAA” prior to state or local governments 
enacting regulations affecting drones.122 Specifically, it urged 
consultation when a state or local government attempted to enact 
“restrictions on flight altitude; flight paths; operational bans; [or] any 
regulation of the navigable airspace.”123 On the other hand, the FAA 
noted, those “[l]aws traditionally related to State and local police 
power[s]—including land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law 
enforcement operations—generally are not subject to Federal regulation” 
and therefore did not urge the same consultation.124 In explaining its 
analysis, the FAA stated that: 
Substantial air safety issues are raised when state or local 
governments attempt to regulate the operation or flight of aircraft. 
If one or two municipalities enacted ordinances regulating 
[drones] in the navigable airspace and a significant number of 
municipalities followed suit, fractionalized control of the 
navigable airspace could result. In turn, this “patchwork quilt” of 
differing restrictions could severely limit the flexibility of FAA 
in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and ensuring safety 
and an efficient air traffic flow. A navigable airspace free from 
                                                     
119. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063, 
42,194 (June 28, 2016) (codified in various sections of 14 C.F.R.). 
120. Id.  
121. Id. See generally OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117. 
122. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117, at 3. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citation omitted). 
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inconsistent state and local restrictions is essential to the 
maintenance of a safe and sound air transportation system.125 
While the issue of deference to the fact sheet’s analysis is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, a cursory analysis is necessary to understanding 
its effect on future preemption litigation. The fact sheet was not 
promulgated through a process of notice and comment rulemaking or 
formal agency adjudication.126 Consequently, it would not receive 
Chevron deference as an interpretation of FAAMRA.127 Nor would it 
benefit from Auer deference128 as an interpretation of Part 107, because it 
was promulgated prior to Part 107.129 Instead, the fact sheet would be 
entitled only to Skidmore deference.130 As a result, a court would defer to 
the agency’s position in the fact sheet only to the extent that its reasoning 
is persuasive.131 
Courts defer to an agency’s analysis of the way in which state law 
conflicts with the agency’s regulations.132 But courts do not simply defer 
to the agency’s conclusion on an issue of preemption.133 Therefore, if a 
litigant cited the fact sheet as evidence of the administration’s position on 
the preemption issue, a court would defer to the agency’s understanding 
of the relationship between Part 107 and state or local drone laws, but 
would perform its own preemption analysis in light of the “patchwork” 
problem.134 
                                                     
125. Id. at 2 (citations omitted). 
126. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,194 (June 28, 2016) (codified in various sections of 14 C.F.R.). 
127. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). An 
agency’s interpretation of a statute receives Chevron deference if (1) Congress has not spoken clearly 
to resolve the question of interpretation and (2) the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 842–44. 
128. See Auer v. Robins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Generally, an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation receives significant deference. Id. at 462–63. Scholars have criticized the evolution of the Auer 
doctrine, and some believe the Supreme Court is poised to significantly curtail it. See, e.g., Sanne Knudsen 
& Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 67 (2015). 
129. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. Auer deference applies to an interpretation of an agency’s existing 
regulation—clearly the FAA could not have been interpreting Part 107 before it existed, so the Fact 
Sheet will not receive Auer deference. Id. 
130. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). If an agency’s interpretation—of a statute or 
a regulation—does not receive Chevron or Auer deference, it receives Skidmore deference. The extent 
to which a court will defer to the agency’s interpretation at the Skidmore level varies considerably, 
depending on factors including the thoroughness evident in the agency’s analysis and “those factors 
which give [ ] [an agency’s statement] power to persuade, [even] if lacking power to [legally] control.” 
Id. at 140. 
131. Id. 
132. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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The fact sheet makes it clear that the FAA considers Part 107 to 
preempt many state and local laws, namely those relating to operational 
restrictions.135 On the other hand, with reference to state and local laws in 
areas such as privacy, trespass, and law enforcement operations, the FAA 
seems willing to permit state and local governments a say in the matter.136 
E. In Singer v. City of Newton, a Federal District Court Struck Down 
a Restrictive Drone Law as Preempted 
In late 2017, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that a 
municipality’s attempt to regulate the use of drones within its jurisdiction 
was preempted by Part 107.137 Newton, Massachusetts enacted an 
ordinance that, among other things, (1) required drone operators to 
register their drones; (2) prohibited drone operators from flying at 
altitudes under 400 feet above private property without the permission of 
the land-owner; (3) prohibited drone operators from flying their drones 
over Newton city property without prior permission from the city and; (4) 
prevented drone operators from flying their drones “beyond the visual line 
of sight of the operator.”138 The plaintiff filed suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, arguing that Part 107 preempted the ordinances.139 
In Singer v. City of Newton,140 the district court granted summary 
judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that the City of Newton’s ordinance was 
preempted by Part 107. The court began its analysis with a nod toward the 
presumption against preemption, discussed more fully later in this 
Comment. The Newton court held that “[u]nder our federalist system . . . a 
court must be wary of invalidating laws in areas traditionally left to the 
states unless the court is entirely convinced that Congress intended to 
override state regulation.”141 However, the court wrote, “if a state 
government attempts to regulate an area traditionally occupied by the 
federal government, a court need not seek to avoid preemption.”142 
Next, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Part 107 
preempted the entire field of drone law, citing the FAA’s fact sheet 
                                                     
135. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117, at 3.  
136. Id. 
137. Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d. 125 (D. Mass. 2017). 
138. Id. at 131–32 (quoting NEWTON, MASS., REV. ORDINANCES § 20-64(c)(1)(b) (2012)). 
139. Id. at 127. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 128–29 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). 
142. Id. at 129 (citing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)). 
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discussed earlier.143 The FAA’s recognition that some areas are 
traditionally not subject to federal regulation was sufficient for the court 
to conclude that neither Congress nor the FAA intended to displace all 
state or local regulations relating to drone operations.144 The court 
reasoned that, if the FAA expressly recognizes the existence of federal 
law, it must not have intended to displace it.145 If it had, the FAA would 
have said so.146 
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the challenged regulations 
conflicted with the FAA’s regulations, and were therefore preempted. As 
to the registration requirement, the court deferred to the FAA’s reasoning 
that it should be “the exclusive means for registering” drones and that, 
“‘no state or local government may impose an additional registration 
requirement.’”147 Next, the court found that the prohibition against 
operating a drone over public or private land without the land owner’s 
permission worked to create an “essential ban on drone use” in the city.148 
Citing both the FAA’s regulations and the statement of congressional 
intent to “‘safely accelerate the integration of [drones] into the national 
airspace system,’”149 the court held that such a ban “thwarts not only the 
FAA’s objectives, but also those of Congress. ”150 
The holding of Singer is important for many reasons. One reason is the 
level of generality at which the court embraced Congress’s intent to 
integrate drones into the national airspace. A blanket ban on all flight 
within city limits, the court said, was clearly in conflict with that intent.151 
However, the court did not constrain its holding to such severe 
restrictions.152 As a result, it is not at all clear what level of restriction 
                                                     
143. Id. at 130.  
144. Id.  
145. Id. In this respect, the Singer court’s reasoning was markedly similar to the reasoning in 
Skysign Intern, Inc., v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
where the federal government recognizes the existence of federal law, it would not have intended to 
preempt it without clearly indicating so). 
146. Singer, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 130. 
147. Id. at 131 (quoting OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117, 
at 2). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 129 (quoting FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 332, 
126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012)). 
150. Id. at 133. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. (not limiting its holding to those state or local regulations which would ban drones 
entirely). 
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would rise to a level of conflict with Congress’s intent sufficient to render 
them preempted—all that is clear is that this ordinance did.  
Singer represents only a single district court’s opinion on the matter, 
but it is worth noting that its reasoning—namely, that Congress wishes to 
integrate drones into the national airspace, and a state or local 
government’s attempt to exclude them from its airspace conflicts with that 
purpose—could be applied even where less severe restrictions impede a 
person’s ability to operate a drone commercially. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION PRESENTS A BARRIER 
TO STATE AND LOCAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE 
DRONES 
Article VI, Section II of the United States Constitution provides that 
the laws of the federal government “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . [any] Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”153 
That provision, known as the “Supremacy Clause,”154 dictates that when 
a federal law is at odds with a state law, the federal law supersedes its state 
counterpart.155 When a state law conflicts with a federal law, the federal 
law is said to “preempt” the state law.156 Borne of the federalist system, 
the doctrine of preemption is based on “the principle that both the National 
and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound 
to respect.”157 The frequency with which conflicts arise has led one 
commentator to denominate preemption as “the most frequently used 
doctrine of constitutional law in practice.”158 Indeed, the way the 
Constitution distributes legislative power between the states and the 
national government means that almost every federal law touches upon an 
area in which the states also have the authority to legislate.159 
                                                     
153. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
154. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012). 
155. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (“In every such case [of conflict between 
federal and state law], the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in 
the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”).  
156. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399 (“Congress has the power to preempt state law.”). 
157. Id. at 398 (citations omitted). 
158. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).  
159. The U.S. Constitution creates a legislature with enumerated, and therefore finite and 
circumscribed, powers. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000). Professor 
Nelson writes that, except for areas of law that the Constitution reserves for the national government, 
such as the power to coin money and enter into treaties, “the states retain concurrent authority over 
most of the areas in which the federal government can act.” Id. 
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Preemption can occur in several ways. Congress can expressly state 
that a federal law preempts any state or local law on the same topic, known 
as express preemption.160 In the absence of express preemption, federal 
law may still “impliedly” preempt state or local laws.161 Implied 
preemption takes two forms: (1) implied field preemption, where federal 
law is so prolific that there is no room for state or local regulation,162 and 
(2) implied conflict preemption, where the purpose or effect of federal law 
clashes with state or local law.163 After surveying two facets of preemption 
doctrine applicable to all three forms, this Part examines each in turn. 
A. Agency Regulations Can Preempt State and Local Law 
Part 107 is a body of agency regulations, not a statute enacted by 
Congress. Nonetheless, where the provision at issue in a preemption 
challenge is a regulation promulgated by a federal agency pursuant to 
authority granted by Congress, its preemptive effect is no less than if it 
were enacted directly by Congress.164 An agency does not need specific 
statutory authority to preempt state law if that preemptive effect is 
consistent with the agency’s statutory mandate.165 In a preemption 
challenge to a federal regulation, courts will inquire whether the 
regulation exceeds, or is outside the scope of, the agency’s statutory 
authority.166 Accordingly, when a court is asked to resolve the preemptive 
effect of a regulation, it will first ask whether the regulation preempts state 
law according to traditional preemption doctrine. If it does, the court will 
then ask whether that preemptive effect is contrary to the agency’s 
statutory mandate. If it is not, the regulation has preemptive effect.167 
In Geier v. American Honda Co.,168 a regulation promulgated by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) required car manufacturers to 
install passive restraint devices in some, but not all, new cars.169 
Manufacturers could choose between a variety of passive restraint 
                                                     
160. Id. at 226. 
161. Id. at 272–78. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 154. 
167. Id. 
168. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).  
169. Id. at 864–65. 
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devices, including automatic seatbelts and airbags.170 Over time, the DOT 
planned to gradually phase-in the restraint device requirements, 
eventually requiring them in all new vehicles. The plaintiff in Geier was 
injured while driving a car unequipped with airbags, and sued under a 
state tort theory that the car’s manufacturer was negligent not to install an 
airbag.171 
The Supreme Court held that the DOT’s regulation conflicted with state 
“no airbag” torts, and therefore that any state requirement that 
manufacturers install an airbag was preempted.172 The Court found that 
Congress, acting through the DOT, did not intend to require airbags in all 
new vehicles, and had a variety of reasons for instead desiring a gradual 
phase-in of the devices.173 Therefore, while both the federal and state law 
stood in pursuit of the same objective—making automobiles safer—the 
state law conflicted with the DOT’s decision regarding how best to 
achieve that goal, and was therefore preempted. 
The Court also credited the DOT’s assertion that state law would pose 
an obstacle to the achievement of the regulation’s objectives.174 It held 
that “[t]he agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own 
regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the 
likely impact of state requirements.”175 The Court also rejected an 
argument that the agency should have included an express preemption 
clause, holding that an agency “ordinarily would not intend to permit a 
significant conflict” between its regulations and state law.176 
Courts defer to an agency’s understanding of the likely conflicts 
between its regulations and state or local law, but are not bound to accept 
an agency’s position on the legal question of preemption.177 In Wyeth v. 
Levine,178 the Court determined the preemptive effect of FDA drug label 
approval on state tort actions alleging a failure to properly warn of a 
medication’s dangers.179 The defendant drug manufacturer argued that the 
                                                     
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 865. 
172. Id. at 874. 
173. Id. at 877–78. The Court considered Congressional objectives related to the cost of airbags, 
certain safety risks associated with airbag deployment, and public buy-in. Id.  
174. Id. at 883 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment)). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 884–85. 
177. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573–80 (2009). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 563–68. 
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FDA’s approval of the drug’s label preempted state tort actions. For 
support, it cited the preamble to the FDA regulation defining the required 
content and format of drug labels, where the FDA stated that its 
regulations preempted state law.180 The Court reiterated that agency 
regulations can preempt state law, but that in such cases a court should 
“perform[ ] its own conflict determination, relying on the substance of 
state and federal law and not on agency proclamations of pre-emption.”181 
While courts are willing to give some credence to an agency’s position on 
the preemption issue, deference extends only to the agency’s 
understanding of how state law conflicts with its regulations, not the 
agency’s “conclusion” on the question of preemption.182 
B. The Presumption Against Preemption Weighs Against Preemption 
in “Close Calls” Implicating Areas of Traditional State Regulation 
Another nuance of preemption doctrine is known as the “presumption 
against preemption.”183 The presumption provides that, when the 
preemption issue involves an area of the law traditionally within the ambit 
of the states’ “police powers,” courts should look for the “clear and 
manifest” intent of Congress to preempt the state law.184 In other words, 
when a state or local law subject to a preemption challenge falls within 
the traditional “police powers,” courts place a thumb on the scale against 
a finding of preemption. Congress’s decision not to include a provision 
expressly addressing the preemption issue may be persuasive to courts,185 
                                                     
180. Id. at 575. Specifically, the preamble stated that the FDA interpreted the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act to “establish[ ] ‘both a “floor” and a “ceiling,”‘ so that ‘FDA approval of 
labeling . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.’” Id. (quoting Requirements on Content and 
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934–
35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601)). 
181. Id. at 576. 
182. Id. at 576–77. 
183. The presumption against preemption has generated a considerable body of scholarship. Some 
legal scholars have called into question how significant a role it actually plays in the Court’s 
preemption decisions. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Mary J. Davis, The “New” 
Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217 (2009). 
184. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. at 565 (2009) (“In all preemption cases, and particularly those in 
which Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied’ . . . [courts] 
‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
185. Id. at 575 (holding that “[Congress’s] silence on the [preemption] issue, coupled with its 
certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not 
intend” its grant of authority to an agency—the FDA—to have preemptive effect). 
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particularly when the state law alleged to pose an obstacle to its federal 
counterpart (e.g., state tort litigation) is well known to Congress.186 
C. Congress Can Expressly Give a Statute Preemptive Effect 
The first way a state or local law can be preempted by federal law is 
when Congress explicitly states its preemptive intent. Congress can 
include an “express preemption” provision, which conclusively 
establishes that the statute is intended to preempt contrary or 
complimentary state law on the same topic.187 Congress has used express 
preemption provisions many times, including in the aviation context.188 
For example, the Airline Deregulation Act states that, “a State, [or] 
political subdivision of a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, 
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to 
a price, route, or service of an air carrier.”189 By including that clause, 
Congress made clear that states are prevented from legislating on issues 
of airline prices, routes, or services. The legislative prohibition applies to 
all state and local laws—including those that conflict with the federal law, 
and even those laws that are exactly the same as it.190 One federal statute, 
at first blush, suggests that the entire field of aviation is expressly 
preempted: “[T]he United States Government has exclusive sovereignty 
of airspace of the United States.”191 Courts have uniformly held, however, 
that this provision is not an express preemption clause, but rather “an 
assertion of exclusive national sovereignty.”192 Cases involving express 
preemption clauses are straightforward, because Congress has left no 
room for uncertainty regarding its preemptive intent. Ambiguity often 
arises, however, with respect to the breadth of those areas that Congress 
delineates “off limits” to state and local governments.193 
                                                     
186. Id. 
187. See Nelson, supra note 159, at 226–27. 
188. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2016) (expressly preempting aspects of state airline 
regulation). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2016). 
192. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595 
(1954) (“The Act, however, did not expressly exclude the sovereign powers of the states.”). 
193. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1996) (identifying the “domain” of 
state laws falling within an express preemption clause). 
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D. Even Absent an Express Preemption Clause, Federal Law May 
“Impliedly” Preempt State Law 
The second form of preemption, more complicated and more frequently 
litigated, is known as “implied preemption.”194 Implied preemption, 
which takes two forms, occurs when a federal law displaces state or local 
law despite a lack of explicit congressional intent. 
1. If the Federal Interest in an Area of Law is Sufficiently Dominant, 
or a Body of Federal Regulations Sufficiently Exhaustive, an Entire 
Area of Law May Be “Field Preempted” 
The first, relatively rare, form of implied preemption is known as “field 
preemption.”195 A federal law “field preempts” state law (1) when 
Congress legislates in “a field in which the federal interest is so dominant 
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject,” or (2) when Congress has so widely or 
exhaustively legislated in a given field “as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”196 
Notably, both express preemption and field preemption prohibit all state 
laws on the same topic, whether in conflict with the federal law, in excess 
of it, or even “parallel to [it].”197 Courts rarely find field preemption in 
many areas of the law, but have done so in some areas, such as subsets of 
immigration law.198 Some aspects of aviation law are field preempted, 
including noise restrictions199 and pilot qualifications.200 
                                                     
194. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). 
195. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012).  
196. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
197. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401. 
198. Id. at 399.  
199. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (“It is the pervasive 
nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude that there is pre-
emption.”).  
200. French v. Pan Am Exp., Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The intricate web of statutory 
provisions affords no room for the imposition of state-law criteria vis-a-vis pilot suitability. We 
therefore conclude, without serious question, that preemption is implied by the comprehensive legal 
scheme which imposes on the Secretary of Transportation the duty of qualifying pilots for air 
service.”). 
16 - Cody.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
2018] FLIGHT AND FEDERALISM 1519 
 
2. Federal Law May Impliedly Preempt Conflicting State or Local 
Law Due to Conflicting Purposes or Effects 
The second form of implied preemption occurs when state and federal 
law conflict. This species of preemption is commonly referred to as 
“conflict preemption.”201 Conflict preemption takes two forms. The first 
occurs when compliance with both a state and a federal law is a “physical 
impossibility.”202 This permutation of conflict preemption is exceedingly 
rare, and the test for finding it is demanding.203 It will not be found, for 
example, where one statute states that conduct is permissible and another 
statute prohibits it—under such circumstances a person could choose not 
to engage in the behavior, thereby complying with both statutes.204 To 
create an implied impossibility preemption situation, one statute must 
require conduct the other statute prohibits, thus presenting a physical 
impossibility of simultaneous compliance with both.205 
The second form of conflict preemption, known as “obstacle 
preemption,” occurs when state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”206 Where federal law conflict preempts state or local law, it is 
physically possible for a regulated entity to comply with both, but the state 
or local law nonetheless interferes with its federal counterpart’s 
purpose.207 Implied obstacle preemption is responsible for a significant 
portion of the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence because—
unlike express or implied impossibility preemption—it requires a court to 
“examin[e] the federal statute as a whole and identify[ ] its purpose and 
intended effects” to determine if the state law in question poses a 
sufficient obstacle to the purpose of the federal statute such that the state 
law will be held preempted.208 
The Supreme Court has recognized an array of purposes for which 
Congress may enact a statute, including those beyond requiring or 
                                                     
201. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (analyzing conflict 
between state tort action and federal regulation). 
202. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). 
203. See Nelson, supra note 159, at 228 (describing physical impossibility preemption as 
“vanishingly narrow”).  
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
207. Id. 
208. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
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prohibiting conduct.209 For example, the Court has recognized 
congressional intent to take a balanced approach in confronting illegal 
immigration.210 In Arizona v. United States,211 the United States sought to 
invalidate an Arizona immigration statute that made it a misdemeanor for 
an undocumented immigrant to work or seek work in the state.212 Under 
federal law, neither working nor seeking work as an undocumented 
immigrant are illegal.213 It is illegal, however, for an employer to hire an 
undocumented immigrant.214 Looking to evidence in the legislative 
record, the Court concluded that “Congress made a deliberate choice not 
to impose criminal penalties on” undocumented immigrants.215 Therefore, 
the Arizona law, in doing what Congress opted not to, posed an obstacle 
to the objectives of federal law.216 The Court noted that the Arizona law 
“attempts to achieve . . . the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of 
unlawful employment” but conflicted with Congress’s chosen “method of 
enforcement.”217 On the basis of that conflict, the state law posed an 
obstacle to its federal counterpart’s objectives and was, therefore, 
preempted.218 
E. Preemption Cases Involving Aerial Advertising Provide Examples 
of Preemption Doctrine in Practice 
Laws involving aerial advertising—the towing of advertising banners 
behind aircraft—implicate elements of traditional state concern.219 For 
example, there is a strong local interest in issues such as the distracting 
                                                     
209. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 405 (2012) (finding that Congress made a 
“deliberate choice” to impose penalties on employers of illegal aliens, but not illegal aliens 
themselves, as means by which to address the problem of illegal immigration). 
210. Id. 
211. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
212. Id. at 403 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(c) (2018)). 
213. Id. at 404 (holding that “the law makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire . . . unauthorized 
workers . . . . [But] does not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee side”). 
214. Id. 
215. While not a crime to seek work as an undocumented immigrant, it is a crime to an employ 
undocumented workers. Id. at 404. The Court looked to the legislative history of the federal statute 
establishing those criminal penalties and concluded that Congress intended to target employers, but 
not the immigrants themselves. Id. at 405. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 406. 
218. Id. 
219. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[A]dvertising is an area traditionally subject to regulation under the states’ police power . . . .”).  
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effect of advertisements.220 However, they also implicate areas of federal 
concern, such as aviation safety.221 Preemption challenges in this area of 
aviation law have already been litigated,222 while the preemption issues 
involved in state and local drone laws remain largely unresolved. 
Therefore, the way courts have addressed preemption in aerial advertising 
might provide insight into how the analysis will look in the drone context. 
In Banner Advertising, Inc. v. City of Boulder,223 the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that a local ordinance prohibiting aerial advertising was 
preempted by federal law.224 Aerial advertising is prohibited under FAA 
regulations, but the FAA had issued the plaintiff a waiver allowing it to 
tow aerial advertising banners.225 The FAA advised the plaintiff that “[the 
waivers] d[id] not constitute a waiver of any state law or local ordinance 
not otherwise preempted by the United States Constitution or Federal 
Statute or Regulation.”226 The plaintiff was cited under the city ordinance 
prohibiting aerial advertising and challenged the citation, arguing that the 
extensive federal aviation regulations, including those on aerial 
advertising, field preempted the state law.227 The City of Boulder argued 
that, because the certificate of waiver specifically mentioned applicable 
local laws, the federal government did not intend to displace them.228 The 
court sided with the plaintiff, citing the broad statutory authority of the 
Secretary of Transportation to formulate regulations for the protection of 
“persons and property on the ground.”229 That, coupled with the fact that 
the FAA had specifically regulated aerial advertising, led the court to hold 
that the local law “impermissibly enter[ed] an arena reserved for the 
federal government” and was preempted.230 
The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments that the federal 
government expressly considered, and chose not to preempt, applicable 
state law.231 It held that the federal government cannot exempt people 
from state or local laws, so “by restricting its direct effect to federal laws, 
                                                     
220. Id. at 1117.  
221. Id. at 1116. 
222. See, e.g., id. (resolving preemption challenge to aerial advertising ordinance). 
223. 868 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1994). 
224. Id. at 1083. 
225. Id. at 1079. 
226. Id. 
227. Banner Advert., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Colo. 1994). 
228. Id. at 1082–83. 
229. Id. at 1081–82. 
230. Id. at 1083. 
231. Id. at 1082. 
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the certificate only states a fundamental principle of the doctrine of 
federalism.”232 Second, and more importantly, the court held that 
“preemption is paramount,” and once a state or local law is preempted by 
a federal law, the state law is entirely without force.233 In other words, a 
state law cannot be revived by the federal government when it opts to 
waive enforcement of federal law.234 Thus, the certificate of waiver’s 
language could not save the ordinance, even if the FAA intended it to, 
because the court concluded that the federal regulations—despite being 
waived—preempted the local law.235 
In Skysign International., Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu,236 the 
Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result.237 There, the court addressed a 
challenge to two Honolulu ordinances, one of which barred certain kinds 
of signage, however displayed, and another that specifically barred the use 
of an aircraft to display signage.238 The plaintiff was an aerial advertising 
firm operating in Hawaii under FAA certificates of waiver, like those in 
Banner, that allowed it to conduct advertising operations otherwise 
prohibited by FAA regulations.239 The plaintiff was cited for violating the 
local ordinances, and argued that the city ordinances were preempted by 
the FAA regulations.240 
The Ninth Circuit began its preemption analysis with reference to the 
presumption against preemption, stating that “advertising is an area [of 
law] traditionally subject to regulation under the states’ police power.”241 
The court held the ordinance applicable to all signage would benefit from 
the presumption against preemption, but the ordinance specifically 
barring aerial advertising did not, because aviation is an area of law 
ordinarily regulated by the federal government.242 
The court reiterated the well-settled assumption that the federal 
government had not expressly or impliedly preempted the entire field of 
                                                     
232. Id.  
233. Id. at 1082–83. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 1083 (“We conclude that the Boulder ordinance impermissibly intrudes into the 
exclusive domain of the federal government to regulate the towing of banners by aircraft.”). 
236. 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002). 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 1113. 
239. Id.  
240. Id. at 1114. 
241. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. Of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002). 
242. Id. at 1116. 
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aviation regulations.243 But unlike the Banner court, the Skysign court 
found that the “mere volume and complexity” of the federal aerial 
advertising regulations did not constitute field preemption without some 
“affirmative accompanying indication” of congressional intention.244 As 
to implied conflict preemption, the Skysign court held that the language 
of the waivers specifically advised the recipients that the waivers excepted 
compliance with applicable federal laws, but did not supersede applicable 
state or local laws.245 That language, the court held, indicated that “the 
federal government contemplates coexistence between federal and local 
regulatory schemes” which meant that “state law cannot by its mere 
existence stand as such an obstacle” to the federal law.246 In Skysign, the 
court cited and explained its disagreement with the Banner decision.247 
The Skysign court considered the two waivers different,248 and explained 
that its only fundamental disagreement was with the Banner court’s field 
preemption analysis.249 
III. MOVING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF DRONE 
PREEMPTION LITIGATION 
This Part predicts how the future of drone litigation will proceed. With 
laws like Chicago’s, cases like Singer are bound to occur throughout the 
country until courts reach a consensus. By drawing on general preemption 
jurisprudence and the aerial advertising line of cases, this Part concludes 
that state and local drone laws imposing substantial operational 
restrictions will be preempted, while those that merely clarify existing 
criminal statutes will not. Finally, for those laws that fall somewhere in 
the middle of those two categories, this Part predicts that courts will utilize 
the presumption against preemption to uphold such laws. 
                                                     
243. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of 
Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595 (1954)). 
244. Id.  
245. Id. at 1118. 
246. Id. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
247. Id. at 1117 n.6.  
248. Specifically, the Skysign waiver said, “[t]he operator, by exercising the privilege of this 
waiver, understands all local laws and ordinances relating to aerial signs, and accepts responsibility 
for all actions and consequences associated with such operations.” Id. at 1113. The Banner waiver 
said “[t]his Certificate constitutes a waiver of those Federal Rules or Regulations specifically referred 
to above. It does not constitute a waiver of any state law or local ordinance not otherwise preempted 
by the United States Constitution or Federal Statute or Regulation.” Banner Advert., Inc. v. City of 
Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Colo. 1994). The Skysign court thought that there was enough 
difference between the two clauses to hold that they were not at odds with one another. Skysign, 276 
F.3d at 1117 n.6.  
249. Id. at 1117 n.6. 
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A. Singer’s Analysis Reflects the Current State of Preemption 
Jurisprudence and Will Likely Be Replicated in Future Challenges 
to State and Local Drone Laws 
Federal preemption of state and local drone laws was a question of first 
impression in Singer, but the issue is almost certain to arise in the future. 
Other courts are not bound to respect the Singer court’s decision or to 
follow its analysis, but many will likely look to it because it is the first 
decision in a new area of the law. Thus, it is worth understanding the 
Singer court’s decision and asking whether it is in line with preemption 
jurisprudence. 
1. Part 107 is Unlikely to Preempt the Field of Drone Law 
Singer was not a field preemption case.250 The court’s holding was 
based entirely on conflict preemption.251 Nonetheless, the issue of field 
preemption is important because courts in the future may look to it given 
that aviation has historically been an area of primarily federal 
regulation.252  
It is unlikely that Part 107 preempts the entire field of drone 
regulations. Field preemption occurs where federal regulations in the area 
of law at issue are so extensive as to “make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or if the regulations 
occupy “a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.”253 Field preemption is not commonly found.254 Where courts do 
find field preemption, it is usually limited to a subset of an area of the 
law.255 
As to the first permutation of field preemption—where Congress has 
left no room for state law—Part 107 covers many aspects of drone 
operations, but not so many as to conclude that the FAA intended it to be 
exclusive body of regulation concerning drones.256 For example, Part 107 
says nothing about the weather conditions in which a person may operate 
                                                     
250. Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d. 125, 130 (D. Mass. 2017). 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 1116. 
253. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (emphasis added). 
254. See Nelson, supra note 159, at 227 (“The Court has grown increasingly hesitant to read 
implicit field-preemption clauses into federal statutes.”). 
255. See supra section II.D.1.  
256. See 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018) (omitting regulations on many aspects of drone operations such 
as permissible weather conditions, visibility conditions, etc.). 
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a drone, so a state prohibition on operation in poor weather conditions 
would likely not be field preempted.257 The same is true for prohibitions 
on flying over state parks.258 Part 107 imposes many requirements and 
limitations, but not so many as to infer that there is no room for 
supplementary state law. 
Field preemption owing to a dominant federal interest in drone 
regulation is also unlikely. The federal interest in consistent drone laws is 
undoubtedly strong—uniformity would allow for the rapid integration of 
drones into the national airspace, given the relative ease of complying 
with one federal regulation compared to numerous different state 
regulations. But state and local governments have competing interests in 
regulating drones themselves. For example, some states may be eager to 
prohibit uses of drones that infringe on citizens’ privacy or put them in 
danger, while others may prioritize the economic benefit drones bring to 
their jurisdictions.259 Thus, because both the state and federal interest in 
regulating drones is strong, neither dominates sufficiently to trigger field 
preemption. 
Courts may find that Part 107 preempts extremely narrow aspects of 
state or local laws. For example, the altitude at which a drone may be 
flown is a straightforward issue, which Part 107 limits to 400 feet. 
Therefore, courts may conclude that Part 107 field preempts the issue of 
drone altitude restrictions, but not other issues, such as weather 
restrictions. 
2. Many State Laws Will Conflict with Part 107 and Therefore Be 
Preempted 
Singer was decided on conflict preemption grounds. Its analysis 
tracked established preemption doctrine,260 and the court’s reasoning is 
likely to be repeated in future litigation. The congressional intent 
expressed in FAAMRA is clear: congress intends to safely and rapidly 
integrate drones into the national airspace.261 The local regulations at issue 
in Singer thus made for an easy decision on conflict preemption. In 
concert, the prohibition on flying above public and private property 
without permission entirely banned drones from city limits. Such an 
outcome clearly conflicts with the objective of integrating drones into the 
                                                     
257. See § 107. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. See Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d. 125, 130 (D. Mass. 2017). 
261. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95 § 332(a)(1) (2012) 
(directing the FAA to develop regulations to integrate drones into the national airspace). 
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national airspace. Other state and local laws, with less restrictive 
prohibitions, will present more complicated questions, but will be subject 
to the same analysis. In other words, courts will still ask whether the laws 
at issue conflict with Congress’s intent to integrate drones. 
Even if the state or local laws at issue do not conflict with Congress’s 
intent to integrate drones into the national airspace, they may conflict with 
the FAA’s vision for how to do so. In other words, a state or local law 
may actually share Congress’s objective, but still clash with some 
provision of Part 107. In that respect, reasoning like the Court’s in 
Arizona—where a state statute had the same objective as the federal 
regulation but was still preempted262—will guide the analysis. The FAA 
has chosen to carry out its statutory mandate of integrating drones in a 
specific way, e.g., by limiting flight to the operator’s line-of-sight during 
the daytime.263 A court might conclude that those choices imply that the 
FAA chose not to adopt other restrictions, e.g., prohibting operation near 
large buildings, or only in fair weather. A more or less restrictive local 
law—even if it did not permit something Part 107 prohibited or prohibit 
something it permits—could still conflict with Part 107, and therefore be 
preempted. 
B. Skysign and Banner May also Provide Useful Guidance for Courts 
in Future Litigation 
The aerial advertising cases may provide helpful guidance in predicting 
future courts’ approaches to preemption challenges. A state or local 
government’s drone law will likely be motivated, at least in part, by 
concern for the safety of people and property on the ground. These 
concerns are similar to those motivating restrictions on aerial advertising. 
Therefore, a preemption challenge to those drone laws would look similar 
in many respects to the fight over aerial advertising in Skysign and Banner. 
This Comment predicts that state or local regulations on drone 
operation will be preempted, and that courts will analyze the issues 
similarly to Banner.264 Even with the benefit of the presumption against 
preemption, insofar as a state regulates the operation of drones, it would 
conflict with the regulations in Part 107. For example, if a state law 
                                                     
262. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 406 (2012). 
263. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.29(a), 107.31(a) (2018). 
264. Banner Advert., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Colo. 1994). Banner and 
Skysign both dealt with waivers of federal law. This Comment primarily looks to conflicts between 
federal and state/local drone laws. Therefore, insofar as the waivers in Banner and Skysign waived 
federal law, they set up a similar issue—conflict between a restrictive state law on the one hand, and 
a less restrictive federal law on the other.  
16 - Cody.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
2018] FLIGHT AND FEDERALISM 1527 
 
prohibited drone flight above 300 feet, where the FAA has limited flight 
to 400 feet, it is likely that a court would follow the Banner court’s 
reasoning and conclude that the federal regulations preempt state law. 
States may argue that Part 107 merely sets the minimum standard and that 
a more restrictive regulation complements, rather than conflicts with, 
Part 107. However, FAAMRA included explicit congressional intent that 
drones be integrated, so a more restrictive state prohibition would 
arguably conflict with that objective by restricting the use of drones.265 
Litigants may cite the FAA’s fact sheet, which details its position on 
the issue of preemption.266 However, courts will only be required to defer 
to the fact sheet insofar as any given court finds its reasoning 
persuasive.267 Courts may defer to its reasoning on the potential for 
conflict between Part 107 and state or local laws. However, courts will 
not simply accept the fact sheet’s legal conclusion regarding conflict-
preemption given the reasoning in Wyeth.268 That is, courts defer to an 
agency’s analysis of the risk for conflict between its regulations and state 
law, but not their legal analysis of the preemption issue.269 In its fact sheet, 
the FAA states simply that a system of varying regulations in each 
jurisdiction is harmful to a uniform airspace. Courts will credit this 
position, but then perform their own conflict analysis.270 
C. Examples of State Drone Laws that Are and Are Not Likely to Be 
Preempted 
The preceding analysis makes clear that state and local drone laws that 
impose significant operational restrictions will be preempted by Part 107. 
Other state or local laws, such as those which expand criminal statutes to 
include drones, will not be preempted. Finally, those laws that impose 
some operational restrictions within the traditional state police power may 
or may not be preempted. For the latter category, the presumption against 
preemption may provide a critical thumb on the scale weighing against 
preemption. This section looks to each category in turn. 
                                                     
265. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11 (2012). 
266. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117, at 3. 
267. See supra section III.A. 
268. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009). 
269. Id. at 576–77.  
270. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117, at 2. 
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1. Restrictive Drone Laws are Most Likely Preempted 
In 2015, the City of Chicago substantially restricted legal drone 
operations within city limits.271 The Chicago ordinance restricted the use 
of drones to “hobby or recreational purposes,”272 and by banning flight 
over public or private property without the landowner’s permission, 
essentially banned all drone flight within the city.273 A person who 
violates the ordinance is subject to fines of between $500 and $5,000 and 
may be imprisoned for up to 180 days.274 Each day a violation occurs 
constitutes a distinct violation of the ordinance.275 
An exception to the Chicago ordinance could be read to exempt 
operations in compliance with Part 107 from the ordinance’s 
restrictions.276 However, as established earlier in this Comment, the most 
natural reading of the exception contemplates specific, case-by-case 
authorizations—not a general set of regulations like Part 107. If a court 
read the exception to require case-specific authorizations, a preemption 
challenge would likely prove fatal to the ordinance. The ordinance 
imposes draconian operational restrictions.277 Congress has expressed its 
intent to integrate drones into the national airspace and delegated that 
responsibility to the FAA.278 Part 107, the manifestation of that intent, 
provides the legal framework for drone operation that is far less restrictive 
than Chicago’s ordinance.279 Thus, the Chicago ordinance blatantly 
interferes with Congress’s clearly expressed objectives, and will likely be 
found to be preempted by Part 107. 
2. Drone Laws that Clarify Other Existing Laws Will Likely Not Be 
Preempted 
In contrast to Chicago’s virtual ban on drone operations, some state and 
local laws expressly prohibit conduct with a drone that would otherwise 
be illegal.280 For example, one proposed bill criminalizes using a drone to 
                                                     
271. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 10-36-400(b)(1) (2018). 
272. Id. 
273. Id. § 10-36-400(b)(3). 
274. Id. § 10-36-400(d). 
275. Id.  
276. Id. § 10-36-400(c)(1). 
277. Id. § 10-36-400(b)(1). 
278. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11 
(2012). 
279. See generally 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018). 
280. See generally supra section I.C.2. 
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deliver contraband to a correctional facility,281 while another state statute 
prohibits using a drone to violate a restraining order.282 These laws, 
because they change little substantive law, are likely not preempted by 
Part 107. 
These state laws are likely safe from preemption by Part 107. First, a 
defendant would be hard-pressed to convince a court that, in the absence 
of the statute, delivering a deadly weapon to a prison with a drone was 
legal—if the defendant was not convicted under the drone-specific statute, 
they would be convicted under some more general criminal law. The 
statutes function to clarify existing legal rules, not create new ones.283 
Secondly, and most importantly, a defendant arguing that the laws are 
preempted would need to argue that the laws conflict with Congress’s goal 
of integrating drones into the national airspace. Such a defendant would, 
in effect, be forced to argue that Congress intended that people be allowed 
to deliver contraband to prisons, or commit voyeurism, using a drone. It 
seems unlikely that a court would embrace such an argument. While these 
laws change little in the way of substantive legal norms, insofar as they 
might be challenged as preempted, they are likely not preempted by 
Part 107. 
3. Laws that Impose New Legal Norms, but that Fall Within the 
Traditional State Police Power, May or May Not Be Preempted 
Many state and local laws fall somewhere in between those that 
significantly curtail drone operation and those that clarify existing 
criminal laws. A number of states, for example, have prohibited the use 
of a drone to hunt or fish.284 While far less restrictive than a law like 
Chicago’s, such a prohibition undoubtedly limits some amount of 
commercial drone use that would occur otherwise. However, this 
Comment concludes that such laws are not so restrictive as to interfere 
                                                     
281. H.B. 2363, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). Washington’s proposed bill passed the 
State House of Representatives and is, as of this writing, pending in committee in the State Senate.  
282. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.322 (4) (2017).  
283. Some of the state and local laws of this kind may impose a different or more severe penalty 
for committing a crime with a drone. This would impose a new legal norm. However, the statutes 
cited here do not impose such a penalty. And so long as the penalty was not significantly greater than 
existing sanctions, this Comment concludes that they would still not be preempted by Part 107. 
284. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.40111c(2) (2017) (“An individual shall not take game or 
fish using an unmanned vehicle or unmanned device . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.24(b) (2014) 
(“It shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor for any person to fish or to hunt using an unmanned aircraft 
system.”); IND. CODE § 14-22-6-16(c) (2017) (“[A] person may not knowingly use an unmanned 
aerial vehicle . . . to search for, scout, locate, or detect a wild animal to which the hunting season 
applies as an aid to take the wild animal.”). 
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with the congressional intent to see drones integrated into that national 
airspace. Moreover, in a preemption challenge, a court may apply the 
presumption against preemption to resolve a close-call in favor of 
upholding the law. 
Many of the laws in this category fall within areas traditionally 
regulated by the states, rather than the federal government. Hunting and 
fishing, for example, are traditionally areas of state regulation.285 That 
implicates the presumption against preemption.286 In fact, the FAA fact-
sheet on preemption specifically identified “prohibitions on using 
[drones] for hunting or fishing” as generally not preempted by Part 107.287 
Thus, a court faced with a preemption challenge to an “anti-drone 
hunting” law may employ the presumption in favor of upholding the law. 
Many of the state and local laws that fall somewhere in this middle 
ground will likely relate to areas of law where state and local governments 
have historically been the dominant regulator, such as “land use, zoning, 
privacy, trespass, and law enforcement operations.”288 Preemption 
challenges to such laws will be less likely to succeed than, for example, 
laws like Chicago’s, because of the presumption against preemption. In 
those cases, the primary issue will be the extent to which Part 107 and 
Congress’s intent to see drones integrated into the national airspace 
conflicts with state law in that specific area. Absent a clear indication that 
Congress intended the federal government to have exclusive authority 
over the area of law, courts will likely employ the presumption against 
preemption to uphold the laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal issues surrounding the integration of drones into the national 
airspace are only beginning to surface. As more state and local 
governments attempt to regulate drone operations, the question of 
preemption will become increasingly important. This Comment sheds 
light on the current legal framework that courts will apply when faced 
with preemption challenges. Part 107 will preempt state and local laws 
that curtail the ability to operate a drone within a given jurisdiction. 
However, not all state and local laws will be preempted. Those laws that 
                                                     
285. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (“By virtue of its police power, 
the state has initial authority to regulate the taking of fish and game.”) (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 
161 U.S. 519 (1896)). That hunting and fishing are areas of traditional state regulation does not mean 
that they are exclusively within the purview of the state. Id. (“The federal government, however, may 
totally displace state regulation in this area.”).  
286. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002). 
287. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 117, at 3.  
288. Id. 
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simply clarify existing law to include drones are safe from preemption 
challenges. Moreover, those that create a new legal norm but fall within 
the traditional state police power may also be safe, due in part to the 
presumption against preemption. 
 
